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NOTES
STATE-COMPELLED FETAL SURGERY: THE VIABILITY
TEST IS NOT VIABLE
"Between the moment of conception and the moment of
delivery, so much can go wrong that it truly is a miracle that so
much goes right."'
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a woman who is in the eighteenth week of her second
pregnancy when she begins to feel that something is not quite right.
The mother notices that the fetus is very active and believes that
the fetus is in pain. The mother goes to her doctor, who performs
an ultrasound test. The test reveals that the fetus is suffering from
hydrocephalus, a build-up of fluid in the ventricals, normally empty
chambers of the brain.2 This build-up can cause brain damage
before birth. If a shunt is not surgically implanted, the fluid build-
up can raise intracranial pressure and enlarge the head, making
normal passage of the fetus through the birth canal impossible. If
the pressure remains elevated, it can destroy white brain matter
and cause mental retardation.
The doctor informs the mother that she has four options. The
first option is to have an abortion. This is possible because the
fetus is not yet determined to be viable. The mother's second op-
tion, delivering the baby by cesarean section to avoid trauma to the
fetal head, is discouraged because the fetus' lungs are not yet fully
developed. This heroic measure would therefore present an un-
acceptable risk to both the mother and the fetus.3
The mother's third option is to let the baby develop, continuing
the pregnancy until labor begins spontaneously. If, during birth,
the fetal head is too large to pass through the birth canal, a needle
1. B.D. Colen, Saving Babies; the Risks, Dilemmas and Rewards of Fetal Surgery,
HEALTH, Aug. 1986, at 59, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, MAGS file.
2. See id. at 61. This scenario was based upon the case study of Sara Hannan who,
unlike the woman in the scenario, chose to undergo the procedure to help her fetus.
Unfortunately, her baby suffered from problems associated with the hydrocephalus for many
years after his birth, despite the efforts to correct the problems in utero.
3. See Carson Strong & Kathy Kinlaw, Maternal Rights, Fetal Harms; Case Study and
Commentaries on Treatment of Prenatal Hydrocephalus and the Ethics of Cephalocentesis,
21 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 21 (1991), available in LEXIS, Nexis library, RXMEGA file.
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can be inserted into the cranium and cerebrospinal fluid extracted
to reduce the fetus' head size. The advantage of this approach is
that it allows the mother to maintain her autonomy and minimizes
the physical risks of both the cesarean section option and the fetal
surgery option. The drawback to this option is significant: this
form of "cephalocentesis almost always results in stillbirth or neo-
natal death within a few days, due to the rapid decompression of
the head or needle-induced hemorrhage. 4
The doctor then informs the mother of her last option, cephalo-
centesis. A shunt can be placed in the fetus' head in utero, allowing
the fluid from the brain to drain into the amniotic fluid. The pro-
cedure, which lasts a little over an hour, begins with the doctors
making three tiny incisions, approximately the width of a pencil, in
the abdomen. Using an ultrasound monitor, the doctors guide a
thin-walled needle, about two millimeters in diameter, through the
incision and into the amniotic cavity, then through the baby's cra-
nium into the enlarged ventricle. When the needle is in position the
stylet inside the needle, similar to the point and cartridge of a
ballpoint pen, is withdrawn allowing a catheter to be threaded
through the hollow needle. The other end of the catheter is left in
the amniotic cavity to allow the fluid to drain from the brain.5
The doctor then explains that cephalocentesis is not always
successful, and sometimes the procedure causes complications. For
example, sometimes the fetus removes the shunt, and the procedure
must be performed again.' The procedure also poses a slight risk
to the mother's reproductive system that could affect her ability to
bear future children.7 Furthermore, there is an increased risk of
preterm labor, which can be controlled to a great extent with drugs
to suppress labor. The risk of preterm labor, however, is reduced
if the fetal surgery is performed early in a fetus' gestation.8
The parents should also weigh the cost of the procedure against
the benefits. Doctors are not always able to determine if a fetus
will receive a greater benefit from in utero treatment, or whether
the hydrocephalus will not advance, allowing the fetus to be treated
4. Id. at 23.
5. See Cheryl Crooks, Healing the Unborn, PARENTS' MAG., June 1988, at 138 (providing
a description of the surgery, its complications, and the effects upon the mother who chose to
have the surgery performed and upon her son for whom the surgery was performed).
6. See id. See also, Colen, supra note 1, at 60 (describing how the doctors were almost
forced to give up the second time they performed the procedure because the fetus would not
hold still).
7. See Crooks, supra note 5, at 140.
8. See id.
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more effectively after birth.9 Furthermore, there is the chance that
even with in utero cephalocentesis, further treatments will be
required after birth and while the child develops."°
The mother and father listen carefully to the doctors' explan-
ations of the four options. The mother is concerned about the
health of her fetus and wants to carry the baby to term. She quick-
ly dismisses the abortion option. The mother has concerns about
any invasive procedure. She delivered her prior child by natural
child birth and has a strong belief in holistic medicine. After care-
ful consideration she determines that she is opposed to any invasive
procedure, even if it is just the insertion of a needle through a small
incision. The mother says that she is aware that this may place her
at risk because of the possibility that the fetus' head will be too
large to pass through her birth canal, and that she is aware that
the baby may be severely mentally retarded, or may even die. She
is convinced, however, that she is making the right decision and
that through meditation and holistic medicine she can prevent any
further complications. She is not opposed to cephalocentesis after
the baby is born and the risk of hydrocephalus has been better
evaluated. The mother, however, does not want any invasive pro-
cedure performed upon her body, including insertion of needles or
a cesarean section."
The issues become more problematic when the above scenario
is changed in one important way - when the fetus is twenty-six
weeks old instead of eighteen weeks old. Because the fetus is
deemed to be viable at approximately twenty-four to twenty-five
9. See id.
10. See id. at 141.
11. See generally Lois Shepherd, Protecting Parents' Freedom To Have Children with
Genetic Differences, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 761. Shepherd argues that the courts, by interfering
with developing fetuses which may have medical problems, such as deafness, label the
children-to-be "defective." Id. at 765. Shepherd asks the question, "Does a child have a right
to be barn free of genetic disabilities, especially considering how we tend to regard genetic
differences as 'defects.' Id. at 766 (citing Lewis Cope, 2010: Arthur Caplan Looks at the
Future of Medicine Today, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), May 17, 1994, at 1E). Should
a mother be held liable because she wants her child to be born the way nature or God
intended it? Perhaps what society considers "defects" the mother sees as uniqueness. Does
the state truly have a compelling interest in guaranteeing that children are barn as close to
perfect as possible? Shepherd sees the advances of technology on a "collision course" with
a greater acceptance of persons with disabilities. "Scientific and medical advances make it
increasingly easier to avoid the births of individuals with disabling genetic differences, just
as we now are appearing to develop the capacity to accept such differences, and perhaps,
even to appreciate them." Id. at 763 (citing James C. Dugan, Note, The Conflict Between
"Disabling"and "Enabling"Paradigms in Law: Sterilization, the Developmentally Disabled,
and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 507 (1993)).
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weeks,' 2 the considerations and arguments for and against in utero
surgery may change significantly within a time period of just a few
weeks.
Although the option of fetal surgery has existed for over a
decade, there has yet to be a case brought by the state or by a father
to compel a woman to undergo fetal surgery. As fetal surgery deve-
lops and becomes more accepted, it will be more readily available as
a viable option to assist mothers and fetuses. As the procedure be-
comes more available and less experimental, we can expect to see
a case of compelled fetal surgery arise in the courts.
While many have voiced concerns about women refusing to
participate in fetal surgery, in reality women have gone to, and
continue to go to, extreme measures to protect and insure the
health of their unborn babies.'" At this time fetal surgery or ther-
apy may be used to correct a variety of fetal disorders. Many of
these disorders are very serious, such as: correcting obstructive uro-
pathies (blocked renal or urinary tracts); 4 cystic adenomatoid mal-
formation; 5 diaphragmatic hernia; 6 sacrococcygeal teratoma (fetal
tumors); 7 abnormal chorionic blood vessels in twins connecting the
circulation of the fetuses; 8 heart blocks; 9 obstructive hydro-
cephalus;2 ° pulmonary or aortic valve obstruction;2' and tracheal
12. Viability was defined as the fetus' potential "to live outside the mother's womb, albeit
with artificial aid. Viability is usually placed at about seven months (28 weeks), but may
occur earlier even at 24 weeks." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160 (1973).
13. See, e.g., John Barbour, Fetal Surgery's Future Doctors Offer Aid As Soon As Possible,
L.A. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 5, 1990, at Al (describing fetal surgery procedure to correct an
improperly developing diaphragm, and stating that only two fetuses had survived out of six
attempts at this type of surgery). See also Science/Medicine Surgery Saves Life of Fetus,
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1990, at B3. The article describes an in utero surgery to correct
congenital cystic adenomatoid malformation (a deformed lung).
The 72-minute procedure involved making an incision in the mother's uterus
and pulling the left arm and chest of the fetus through the opening. Surgeons
then cut open the chest of the fetus surgically removed the malformed lung
lobe, put the fetus back in the womb and closed the incision.
Id. See also Marrow Shots Protect Fetus, WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 1995, at A2 (explaining the
procedure performed upon a fetus, saving its life, where doctors inject bone marrow taken
from the father into the abdominal cavity of the fetus at sixteen, seventeen, and eighteen
weeks of gestation). See also Colen, supra note 1; Crooks, supra note 5.
14. See Wolfgang Holzgreve & Mark I. Evans, Nonvascular Needle and Shunt Placements
for Fetal Therapy, 159 W.J. MED. 333, 334-35 (1993).
15. See Michael R. Harrison, Fetal Surgery, 159 W.J. MED. 341, 344-45 (1993).
16. Id. at 346.
17. Id. at 347.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 347-48.
20. Id. at 348. See text accompanying supra notes 1-10.
21. Id.
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atresia (airway obstruction).22 Some are merely cosmetic, such as
cleft lip and palate reparation.23
Although no cases concerning compelled fetal surgery have yet
arisen, this Note will discuss the state of the law and its proper
expansion in light of developing technology. In Section Two, this
Note will examine courts' decisions in the cases most analogous to
state-compelled fetal surgery - state-compelled cesarean section.
This Note will analyze the two doctrinally opposed state-compelled
cesarean section cases of In re A.C.24 and Jefferson v. Griffin
Spalding County Hospital Authority,2" as well as cases that applied
similar reasoning in the realm of forced cesarean sections, fetal
therapy, and personal autonomy. In Section Three, this Note will
examine the rights to which a mother is entitled. The Note will
then analyze the duties courts have determined a mother owed to
her unborn baby. The Note will analyze how these rights and
duties effect a mother in a case of state-compelled fetal surgery.
Finally, in Section Four, this Note will examine why the viability
test is illogical and inappropriate in cases of state-compelled fetal
surgery.
II. THE FORCED CESAREAN SECTION AND PERSONAL AUTONOMY
CASES
The United States Supreme Court has stated that a competent
person has a constitutionally protected right to refuse medical
treatment.2" The Court also stated that this right is not absolute
and must be balanced against the state's interests. These interests
include preserving life, preventing suicide, maintaining the ethical
integrity of medical practice, and protecting innocent third
parties.27
In the case of forced cesareans it is these interests, the
individual's and the state's, that are balanced. The state's interests
22. Id.
23. Id. at 349. The article notes that the advantage of fetal surgery is that fetuses do not
scar, apparently no matter how invasive the procedure. The article also notes, however, that
"the theoretical benefits of repair of these nonfatal defects before birth are unproved and do
not justify the risks of intervention." Id.
24. 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990).
25. 274 S.E.2d 457 (Ga. 1981).
26. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) ('The principle that
a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted
medical treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions.").
27. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985) (citing Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So.
2d 359 (Fla. 1980)); In re Spring, 399 N.E.2d 452, 456 (Mass. 1979); In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d
332, 339 (Minn. 1984); In re Coyler, 660 P.2d 738, 743 (Wash. 1983)).
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in these cases, however, do not include concern for the welfare of
the mother as a patient. These cases recognize the state's interest
in another patient - the fetus. In the cases where the court has
recognized the state's interests in the fetus, the court has
overridden the mother's right to refuse medical treatment and
ordered that the woman undergo a cesarean.2"
28. See Jefferson, 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990). Michelle Harrison provides a useful
description of a cesarean section, emphasizing the invasiveness of the procedure:
The surgeon takes a scalpel from the nurse and with one strong and definite
motion creates a crescent-shaped incision along the woman's public [sic]
hairline. As the skin is cut, the subcutaneous tissue bulges upward as though
it had been straining to get through all the time. Within moments this fatty
tissue, interconnected by thin transparent fibers, becomes dotted and then
covered with blood that oozes out of tiny vessels. With scalpel and forceps -
delicate tweezers - the surgeon cuts deeper beneath the subcutaneous tissue,
to a thick layer of fibrous tissue that holds the abdominal wall in place. Once
reached, this fibrous layer is incised and cut along the lines of the original
surface incision while the muscles adhering to the tissue are scraped off and
pushed out of the way. The uterus is now visible under the peritoneum, a layer
of thin tissue looking like Saran Wrap, which covers most of the internal organs
and which, when inflamed, produces peritonitis. The peritoneum is lifted away
from the uterus and an incision is made in it, leaving the uterus and bladder
easily accessible. The bladder is pulled away from the uterus, for the baby will
be taken out through an incision in the uterus underneath where the bladder
usually lies....
The uterus of the pregnant woman is large, smooth and glistening. Shaped
like a huge pear, the top and sides are thick and muscular, the lower end thin
and flexible....
The obstetrician extends the initial cut either by putting two index fingers
into the small incision and ripping the uterus open or by using blunt-ended
scissors and cutting in two directions away from the initial incision. If the
membranes are still intact, they are now punctured by toothed forceps, and the
fluid spills out onto the table. In the normal position, the baby's head is down
and under the incision, so the obstetrician places.one hand inside the uterus,
under the baby's head, and with the other hand exerts pressure on the upper
end of the uterus to push the baby through the abdominal incision. The
assistant also uses force now to help push the baby out....
The rest of the surgery is more difficult for the woman. There is more pain
and women often vomit and complain of difficult breathing as we handle their
organs and repair the damage....
The placenta separates from or is pulled off the inside of the uterus. Then,
since the uterine attachments are all at the lower end, near the cervix, the body
of the uterus can be brought out of the abdominal cavity and rested on the
outside of the woman's abdomen, thus adding both visibility and room in which
to work.
With large circular needles and thick thread a combination of running and
individual stitches is used to sew closed the hole in the uterus. A drug called
pitocin is added to the woman's IV to help the uterus contract and to decrease
the bleeding. Small sutures are used to tie and retie bleeding blood vessels.
The "gutters," spaces in the abdominal cavity, are cleared of blood and fluid.
The uterus is then placed back in the abdominal cavity. The bladder is sewn
back onto the surface of the uterus, and then finally the peritoneum is closed.
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In the case of Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding Hospital Authority,"
the Supreme Court of Georgia granted the state's petition for tem-
porary custody of the unborn child, providing the state with "full
authority to make all decisions, including giving consent to the sur-
gical delivery appertaining to the birth of this child."0 The Super-
ior Court of Georgia first noted that the "child" was viable and fully
capable of sustaining life independent of the mother, and then
framed the issue of the case as "whether this unborn child has any
legal right to the protection of the [c]ourt."31 The court noted that
to abort a child at this stage in the proceeding would be a criminal
offense in Georgia.32 The court further stated that "[b]ecause the
life of defendant and of the unborn child are, at the moment, inse-
parable, the [c]ourt deems it appropriate to infringe upon the
wishes of the mother to the extent it is necessary to give the child
an opportunity to live."3 The court then ordered the defendant to
submit to a sonogram. If that sonogram indicated that the placenta
privia was still blocking "the child's passage into this world" then
the defendant was ordered to submit to a cesarean section and
"related procedures considered necessary by the attending physi-
cian to sustain the life of this child."34 This decision was based
Now sponges are counted to be sure none have been left inside the abdominal
cavity, and then closure of the abdominal wall begins.
Muscles overlying the peritoneum are pushed back in place, and are
sometimes sewn with loose stitches. Fascia, the thick fibrous layer, is the most
important one, since it holds all the abdominal organs inside and keeps them
from coming through the incision, especially if the woman coughs or sneezes.
Therefore this layer is closed with heavy thread and many individual stitches
so that, even if a thread breaks, the stitches won't all come out. The
subcutaneous tissue, most of which is fat, is closed in loose stitches that mainly
close any air spaces which might become sites for infection. Skin, the final
layer, is closed with either silk or nylon thread or metal staples....
A dry bandage is placed over the woman's incision and then taped to her
skin. The drapes are removed. A baby has been born.
MICHELLE HARRISON, A WOMAN IN RESIDENCE 81-84 (1982), quoted in Janet Gallagher,
Prenatal Invasions & Interventions: What's Wrong with Fetal Rights, 10 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J.
9, 36 n.137 (1987). Some fetal surgery procedures are similarly invasive as they too involve
entering the womb. See, e.g., supra notes 5, 13, 15-23.
29. 274 S.E.2d 457 (Ga. 1981).
30. Id. at 459.
31. Id. at 458.
32. See id. (citing GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1201, 26-1202 (1980)).
33. Id. It should be noted that the court's opinion does not even address the religious
beliefs of the mother, and her refusal based upon those beliefs. The religious issue is
addressed only in the concurring opinion of Justice Smith, where he analogizes the current
situation to religion requiring human sacrifices. See id. at 461 (Smith, J., concurring).
34. Id. at 459-60.
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upon the premise that the state has an interest in protecting the
lives of unborn, viable children.3"
The court in In re Jamaica Hospital6 took a similar approach.
The court recognized the state's interest in protecting life, even
potential life, as a compelling interest. By holding that this interest
was compelling, the court was able to rule that the state's interest
overrode the woman's right to bodily integrity.3 7 The court held
that the state's parens patriae power overrode the woman's right to
refuse treatment. The court overrode the mother's right to bodily
integrity even though the eighteen-week-old fetus was not yet
viable and, therefore, the state's interest was not compelling under
Roe V. Wade. The court held that "the state has a highly significant
interest in protecting the life of a mid-term fetus, which outweighs
the patient's right to refuse a blood transfusion on religious
grounds.""8
Note that the state would not have a compelling interest in the
non-viable fetus, nor would it have a "highly significant interest,"
sufficient to allow it to prevent the mother from having an abortion.
It is incongruous to hold that the state has an interest significant
enough to overcome the mother's personal privacy, autonomy, and
free exercise of religion, and can require the mother to have a
cesarean section, but does not have an interest sufficient to require
the mother merely to carry the fetus to term.
In the case of Taft v. Taft,39 the court examined whether a
husband could compel his wife to undergo a "purse string 4 ° opera-
tion to prevent her from having a probable miscarriage. The wo-
man had refused the procedure based upon her religious beliefs as
35. See id. at 460 (Justice Hill, concurring). In the case of In re Madyun, 573 A.2d 1235
(D.C. 1990), the Superior Court of the District of Columbia followed the court's decision in
Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding and held that "the state has an 'important and legitimate
interest in protecting the potentiality of human life.'" Id. at 1262 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 162 (1973)). See Rebekah R. Arch, The Maternal-Fetal Rights Dilemma: Honoring
a Woman's Choice of Medical Care During Pregnancy, 12 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POLY
637, 654-56 (1996) (providing an in-depth look at the court's analysis and decision).
36. 491 N.Y.S.2d 898 (Sup. Ct. 1985).
37. See id. at 900.
38. Id. (emphasis added). Note the importance of the case to the scenario presented. The
court did not require that the fetus be viable to provide the state with a compelling interest
in protecting the fetus. A court could easily extend this holding to fetal surgery of the type
described, because the cephalocentesis arguably involves a minimal amount of intrusion,
much like a blood transfusion.
39. 446 N.E.2d 395 (Mass. 1983).
40. This is a procedure where the cervix is sutured so that it will hold the pregnancy.
The mother had undergone this procedure for all of her three prior children. Her fourth
pregnancy was terminated due to a miscarriage because the wife refused the procedure. See
id. at 396.
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a newly "born again Christian."41 The court does not decide the
question of "whether, in some situations, there would be justifi-
cation for ordering a wife to submit to medical treatment in order
to assist in carrying a child to term." 2 The court does note, how-
ever, that the state's interest, in some undefined circumstance,
might be sufficiently compelling to 'justify such a restriction of the
constitutional right of privacy. '43 The court did not state clearly
upon which constitutional right, privacy or religion, it was basing
its opinion. It appears to be a combination of both." This decision
carefully noted the lack of medical data concerning the necessity of
the surgery to prevent the death of the mother or the fetus, and of
the risks caused by the surgery to both the mother and the unborn
child, thereby allowing for the future application of the balancing
test, used in other cases, which could compel the mother to undergo
medical procedures against her will.45
The court in the case of In re A.C.46 addressed a similar issue
in arguably more exigent circumstances. A.C., the mother, was
close to death from cancer and was twenty-six and one-half weeks
pregnant.47 Although A.C. was on life support, she was arguably
competent to make decisions, and there was testimony that she de-
cided not to consent to the cesarean. The trial court ordered that
the cesarean be performed, and a baby girl was delivered. Trag-
ically, the baby girl died after only living two and one-half hours,
and the mother died two days later.48
The appellate court held that the balancing test applied by the
motions division of the district courts was not proper. The majority
based its decision on its analysis of the doctrines of informed
consent, bodily integrity, due process, substituted judgment and
policy considerations. The court held that
41. Id.
42. Id. at 397.
43. Id.
44. See id. The court states that it knows of no case in which a court ordered a pregnant
woman to submit to a surgical procedure in order to assist in carrying a non-viable fetus to
term. The court then cited Jefferson v. Griffin Spaulding County Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d
457 (Ga. 1981), and the case of Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 201 A.2d 537 (N.J.)
(per curiam) cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964), both of which required a woman to undergo
medical procedures, against her religious beliefs to prevent her unborn child from dying. See
id. at 397 n.4.
45. Arguably, the court uses Jefferson v. Griffin Spaulding County Hosp. Auth. and Paul
Morgan Memorial Hosp. V Anderson, to provide some persuasive precedence for the
application of such a balancing test. See supra note 44.
46. 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990).
47. It is questionable whether, under the viability standards established in Roe v. Wade,
the fetus was viable. See supra note 12.
48. See 573 A.2d at 1238.
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in virtually all cases the question of what is to be done is to be
decided the by the patient - the pregnant woman49 - on behalf
of herself and the fetus. If the patient is incompetent or
otherwise unable to give an informed consent to a proposed
course of medical treatment, then her decision must be
ascertained through the procedure known as substituted
judgment.'
The court took special note of the case of McFall v. Shimp,5" in
which the court refused to order Shimp to donate bone marrow to
his cousin even though Shimp's refusal to do so would mean death
for McFall. The court would not order Shimp to have his body
invaded against his will, stating,
The common law has consistently held to a rule which provides
that one human being is under no legal compulsion to give aid
or to take action to save another human being or to rescue. For
our law to compel defendant to submit to an intrusion of his
body would change every concept and principle upon which our
society is founded. To do so would defeat the sanctity of the
individual, and would impose a rule which would know no
limits, and one could not imagine where the line would be
drawn. 2
The argument that fetal cases are different because "a woman who
'has chosen to lend her body to bring [a] child into the world' has an
enhanced duty to assure the welfare of the fetus, sufficient even to
require her to undergo caesarean surgery" was dismissed by the
court.53 The court stated that a fetus cannot have rights superior
to those of a person who has already been born. 4 The court further
noted that the right to refuse medical treatment is of constitutional
magnitude.5 5
49. Id. at 1237. Note that the court carefully differentiates who the patient is - the
pregnant woman. This is in direct conflict to the cases discussed supra where the court also
examined the rights of the fetal patient.
50. Id.
51. 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90 (1978).
52. Id. at 91, quoted in In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1244 (D.C. 1990).
53. In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1244 (quoting and discussing John Robertson, Procreative
Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405, 456
(1983)).
54. See id. at 1244.
55. See id. (citing In re Bryant, 542 A.2d 1216, 1218 (D.C. 1988); In re Boyd, 403 A.2d 744,
748 (D.C. 1979); In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. 1972). The court also notes that other
courts have found constitutional basis for refusing medical treatment. See, e.g., United
States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479, 491 nn.18-19; Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1392-93 (10th
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The court also relied upon the Supreme Court's decision in
Winston v. Lee.56 In Winston, a Virginia court ordered a robbery
suspect to undergo surgery to remove a bullet from his shoulder for
use as evidence of his guilt or innocence. The Supreme Court held
that this would violate the defendant's constitutional rights. The
Court stated that the main function of the Fourth Amendment is to
"protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intru-
sion by the State," and that these values were "basic to a free
society. 5 7 The Supreme Court also held that this procedure "would
be an 'extensive' intrusion on respondent's personal privacy and
bodily integrity" and a "virtually total divestment of respondent's
ordinary control over surgical probing beneath his skin."58
The A. C. court also noted that the Supreme Court in Winston
stated that the Fourth Amendment neither "forbids nor permits all
such intrusions . . . ."" The court in In re A. C. notes that the
"state's interest in preserving life must be truly compelling to just-
ify overriding a competent person's right to refuse medical treat-
ment."'
In comparison to the petitioner in Winston, the woman in the
hypothetical would be subjected to three incisions, not one. Al-
though the incisions might not be very deep, the insertion of the in-
strument to drain the fluid might be quite deep, and probably would
be deeper than the proposed incision in Winston. Furthermore, in
Winston the procedure was proposed as part of a search for evidence
of a criminal action.
Women may be deterred from becoming pregnant, or main-
taining their pregnancy, if they realize that if they allow their
fetuses to reach the age of viability the state may invade their
bodies to the same or greater degree as a suspected criminal. Many
women heavily weigh the many detrimental effects even uncom-
plicated pregnancies can have on their bodies. Many of these
women, especially feminists, may react strongly to the knowledge
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1214 (1985); Rasmussen ex rel. Mitchell v. Fleming, 741
P.2d 674, 681-82 (Ariz. 1987).
56. 470 U.S. 753 (1985). The court in In re A.C. also relied upon Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757 (1966); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952); and Union Pacific Ry. v.
Botsfor, 141 U.S. 250 (1891) ("No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by
the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own
person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable
authority of law.").
57. Id. at 760 (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966)).
58. Id. at 764-765, quoted in In reA.C., 573 A.2d at 1245.
59. Id. at 760, quoted in In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1245.
60. In reA.C., 573 A.2d at 1246 (citing In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. 1972); Tune v.
Walter Reed Army Med. Hosp., 602 F. Supp. 1452, 1455-56 (D.C. 1985)).
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that one of the possible effects of pregnancy on their bodies could be
a state order to undergo invasive medical procedures that the state
could not force a criminal, or a charged criminal-defendant, to un-
dergo. These women may refuse to subject themselves to the possi-
bility of state subjugation. The state, if it truly has an interest in
the welfare of families and children, should not enforce a policy that
could have this type of backlash.
The court in In re A. C. also stated that an additional argument
for honoring A.C.'s objections to a cesarean was provided by the
American Public Health Association in its amicus curiae brief:
Rather than protecting the health of women and children, court-
ordered caesareans erode the element of trust that permits a
pregnant woman to communicate to her physician - without
fear of reprisal - all information relevant to her proper
diagnosis and treatment. An even more serious consequence of
court-ordered intervention is that it drives women at high risk
of complications during pregnancy and childbirth out of the
health care system to avoid coerced treatment.6'
The court also examined the policy argument of adequate
representation, which it believed to be even more compelling than
the doctor-patient relationships. 62 The court noted that, during the
exigent circumstances in which these cases tended to arise, the
attorneys for the patient could not expect to be adequately pre-
pared, that procedural flaws were likely to occur, and that the facts
were likely to be incomplete, if present at all, for consideration by
the court.63
The court also examined the issue of substituted judgment,
holding that it was the best procedure to follow in a case such as
this one because it most clearly respects the patient's right to bodily
integrity. The substituted judgment test is a subjective test requir-
ing a court to determine, as nearly as possible, what the patient
would do if the patient were competent.
64
61. Id. at 1248. A court footnote refers to a case in which a woman who was court-
ordered to undergo a cesarean section went into hiding and gave birth to her child vaginally.
Id. at 1264 n.16 (citing Nancy K. Rhoden, The Judge in the Delivery Room: The Emergence
of Court-Ordered Cesareans, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1951, 1959-69 (1986)).
62. See id.
63. See id. See also Rhoden, supra note 61, at 1959-69.
64. See In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1249. The importance of the application of the subjective
test should not be overlooked. Using substituted judgment, the court does not perform a
balancing test, but tries to ascertain what the patient would do. See id. Therefore, if the
patient was competent, as in the scenario provided, the court, when following the premise
behind the subjective substituted judgment test, should adhere to the patient's wishes.
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Although women's rights activists hailed In re A. C. as a victory
for their movement, the court still left the door open. The court stat-
ed that, while the mother's wishes are controlling in virtually all
cases, the court did not "foreclose the possibility that a conflicting
state interest may be so compelling that the patient's wishes must
yield, [while] anticipat[ing] that such cases will be extremely rare
and truly exceptional." 5
The court in the case of In re Baby Boy Doe66 applied the A. C.
court's reasoning:
The fact that the state may prohibit post-viability pregnancy
terminations does not translate into the proposition that the
state may intrude upon the woman's right to remain free from
unwanted physical invasion of her person when she chooses to
carry her pregnancy to term.... [I]t [is] clear that, even in the
context of abortion, the state's compelling interest in the
potential life of the fetus is insufficient to override the woman's
interest in preserving her health.67
The court applied the balancing test, weighing the mother's right to
refuse medical care against the four state interests: "the preser-
vation of life, the prevention of suicide, the protection of third par-
ties, and the ethical integrity of the medical profession."6 The
court quickly disposed of the state's interest in the preservation of
life and the prevention of suicide as irrelevant. The court stated
that, "[a]lthough it might be argued that the State has an interest
in the preservation of the potential life of the fetus, courts have
traditionally examined the refusal of treatment as it impacts upon
the preservation of the life of the maker of the decision."69
Agreeing with the reasoning of In re Dubreuil,v° the court in In
re Baby Boy Doe stated that "third parties" refers to family
65. Id. at 1252 (footnote omitted). See generally Tracey E. Spruce, The Sound of Silence:
Women's Voices in Medicine and Law (March 4, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the William & Mary Journal of Women and the Law). Spruce describes how the court failed
to tell the story of the mother, A.C. Spruce further states that by not determining what
A.C.'s wishes were, the court followed a long line of courts and doctors that do not listen to
their patients. See id.
66. 632 N.E.2d 326 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
67. Id. at 334 (citing Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992)).
68. Id.
69. Id. The court noted that the cesarean section would have presented a greater risk
to the mother. The court included in its findings that the chances of a mother dying during
a cesarean section are about 1 in 10,000, while the odds of a mother dying during normal
birth are about 1 in 20,000 to 1 in 50,000. See id. at 328.
70. 629 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 1993). See also infra note 95 and accompanying text.
19981
480 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 4:467
members and in particular to, "the children of the person refusing
treatment."7 "Where an individual's decision to refuse treatment
will result in orphaning an already-born child, courts have indica-
ted that this is one factor they might consider."72
The court noted that the final factor of the balancing test, the
ethical integrity of the medical profession, weighs in the mother's
favor rather than in the State's.73 The court observed that the
medical profession strongly upholds the mother's autonomy. 74 The
court stated that, in keeping with the doctrine of informed consent,
the proper action by the medical profession in a situation where the
mother refuses medical treatment that may affect her fetus is to
"urge her to seek consultation and counseling from a variety of
sources."75 The court stated that the actions taken by the medical
professionals in In re Baby Boy Doe appeared to be incongruous
with the ethical position of the profession.76
III. WHAT ARE THE MOTHER'S RIGHTS AND DUTIES?
A. The Mother's Rights
1. Privacy, Autonomy & Bodily Integrity
A pregnant woman's right to make decisions regarding her
health and welfare is well established as part of the common law
rights of bodily integrity and self-determination, along with the
privacy rights found in the Fourth, Eighth and Thirteenth Amend-
ments to the Constitution.77 This right of privacy was first esta-
blished in Griswold v. Connecticut.78 The government may only
interfere with the fundamental right of privacy if it can establish a
compelling interest that cannot be facilitated in a less restrictive
manner.
79
71. In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d at 334.
72. Id. (citing In re Brooks Estate, 205 N.E.2d 435 (IlM. 1965); Wons v. Public Health
Trust, 500 So. 2d 679 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) approved, certified question answered, 541
So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1989); Winthrop Univ. Hosp. v. Hess, 490 N.Y.S.2d 996 (Sup. Ct. 1985)).
73. See id.
74. See id. at 334-35 (citing Report, Legal Interventions During Pregnancy: Court Ordered
Medical Treatments and Legal Penalties for Potentially Harmful Behavior by Pregnant
Women, 264 JAMA 2663, 2670 (1990)).
75. Id. at 335
76. See id.
77. See Gallagher, supra note 28, at 28.
78. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See Gallagher, supra note 28, at 28 & n.99.
79. See Gallagher, supra note 28, at 28-29.
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Not only has the right of privacy been established for marri-
age, o procreation8' and abortion,82 but it has also been established
in the context of child development83 and family life.84 There is a
strong presumption that parents are acting in their child's best
interest when they make decisions regarding their child's medical
care:
The law's concept of the family rests on a presumption that
parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and
capacity for judgment required for making life's difficult
decisions. More important, historically it has recognized that
natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best
interests of their children.85
These cases, highlighting courts' reluctance to examine the
decisions made by parents, are strikingly inconsistent with the
reasoning of the state-compelled cesarean cases. "Although courts
will generally authorize the immediate, lifesaving treatment of
children over parental objections, they only reluctantly invade 'the
very heart of a family circle[,] . . . the most private and most
precious responsibility vested in the parents for the care and
nurture of their children."' 6
Roe v. Wade has been used in the arguments of both the
women's and fetal right's movements. Those arguing for women's
rights rely upon the fact that "Roe makes [it] clear that a woman's
life and health outweigh any state interest that may be asserted in
the potential life of a viable fetus."87 Fetal rights advocates rely,
however, upon the following passage:
With respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in
potential life, the "compelling" point is at viability. This is so
because the fetus then presumably has the capability of
meaningful life outside the mother's womb.... If the state is
80. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1966).
81. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 491.
82. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
83. See Pierce v. Societies of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
84. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
85. Gallagher, supra note 28, at 30 & n.108 (quoting Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602
(1979); (citing In re L.H.R., 321 S.E.2d 716, 722 (Ga. 1984); Halderman v. Pennhurst State
School & Hosp., 707 F.2d 702, 707 (3d Cir. 1983))).
86. Id. at 30 & n.110 (quoting Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 456 N.E.2d 1186 (N.Y. 1983)
(rebuffing efforts of stranger to veto parents' choice of medical treatment for severely ill
newborn)).
87. Gallagher, supra note 28, at 15-16 (citing Thornburgh v. American College of Obstet.
& Gynecol., 476 U.S. 747 (1986)).
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interested in protecting fetal life after viability, it may go so far
as to proscribe abortion during that period, except when it is
necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.88
Under the viability test, as proposed by Roe v. Wade, a mother's
privacy interests outweigh the state's interest in a non-viable fetus.
The state's interests are not compelling unless the fetus is viable.89
The invasiveness of the state's actions in preventing abortions, how-
ever, is much higher than the potential for invasiveness proposed
in the fetal surgery option in the scenario which began this Note.
While the state's interest in a pre-viable fetus has never been held
by the Supreme Court to outweigh a mother's right to personal
autonomy and privacy, the mother's right to privacy has been
recognized to the point of conception and before. 0
It may be argued that the state has an economic interest in
trying to guarantee that the healthiest children possible are born
within its borders. This argument fails under the pre-viability
concern because it is in opposition to the argument opposing abor-
tion. It would be inconsistent for the state to argue for the birth of
children that are not wanted by their mothers, therefore posing an
economic hardship on the state, while arguing that the state's
economic interest in preventing the cost of malformed children
warrants violating a woman's fundamental right of privacy.
2. Informed Consent
The doctrine of informed consent is strongly rooted in the con-
cept of autonomy and places a duty upon the doctor to reasonably
disclose information about a proposed procedure to the patient.9'
This information must include a description of the risks of under-
going" and not undergoing the procedure.93  There are three
grounds under which informed consent procedures, or even the
patient's decision to undergo or not undergo the procedure may be
88. Id. at 15 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973)).
89. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
90. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 491 (1965).
91. See Katherine A. Knopoff, Can a Pregnant Woman Morally Refuse Fetal Surgery?, 79
CAL. L. REV. 499, 513-14 (1991).
92. See, e.g., id. at 513-14 & n.78 (citing Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 10 (Cal. 1972); Natanson
v. Mine, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106 (Kan. 1960)).
93. See, e.g., Knopoff, supra note 91, at 514 n.79 (citing Truman v. Thomas, 611 P.2d 902,
906 (Cal. 1980)).
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set aside: if the patient is incompetent;94 if the patient consents or
refuses a procedure based upon inadequate information; and for
public policy reasons.95
In the issue at hand, the third rationale is the only relevant
one. The state's interest in the patient's health might allow the
state to set aside the patient's decision in order to protect the
mother's life.96
In the introductory scenario, the mother's health could be
affected. If the cephalocentesis is not performed, the fetus' head
may swell to the point that it would be unable to pass through the
mother's birth canal. While the- mother's safety may justify the
procedure if the baby's head were to become lodged at the time of
the birth, the procedure would not be justified before any proven
threat to the mother could be determined. Until then, the mother
has the right to refuse medical treatment. As long as the doctor
fully informs her of the risk, her decision would not risk invalida-
tion as "not fully informed."97
The protection of the mother's life has been justified by the
state's interest in the fate of third parties if the mother was to die.98
The Appellate Court of Illinois faced the question of whether a court
"can balance whatever rights a fetus may have against the rights of
a competent woman to refuse medical advice to obtain a cesarean
section for the supposed benefit of her fetus."99 The court in In re
Baby Boy Doe held that "a woman's competent choice in refusing
.medical treatment as invasive as a cesarean section during her
94. See, e.g., Khiem v. United States, 612 A.2d 160 (D.C. App. 1992) (affirming decision
that defendant charged with murder may be committed and treated to render him competent
to stand trial, despite his objections). See also, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-2201(a) (1989).
Entitled the Health-Care Decisions Act, the purpose of the act is "[To affirm the right of all
competent adults to control decisions relating to their own health care and to have their
rights and intentions in health care matters respected an implemented by others if they
become incapable of making or communicating decisions for themselves." Id., cited in Khiem,
612 A.2d at 169.
95. See, e.g., In re Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d 819, 827 (Fla. 1993) (stating that if the patient
refuses to consent to a procedure which could save her life, and her death would result in the
total abandonment of her children, the state may override her refusal to consent).
96. The balancing test, applying the state's interests in: protecting third parties who are
dependent on the mother, preventing suicide, and maintaining ethical integrity of the
medical profession, only justifies "protecting the patient's health - never a third party's."
See Knopoff, supra note 91, at 516 n.88 (citing Superintendent of Belchertown State School
v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425 (Mass. 1977)). 'Therefore, the state could not justify
overriding a mother's refusal to donate an organ to save her child's life, although it might
justify forcing her to accept an organ transplant to save her own." Id.
97. See Knopoff, supra note 91, at 538-39 (proposing a statute that would specifically
state that the informed consent doctrine applies to fetal surgery).
98. But see text accompanying infra notes 118, 119, 123, 126-28.
99. In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d-326, 326 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
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pregnancy must be honored, even in circumstances where the choice
may be harmful to her fetus."'" The caveat of "invasive" may make
this case useless if a case such as the introductory hypothetical
were to arise in Illinois. The invasiveness of three small incisions"°'
hardly compares to that of a cesarean. 0 2 The court noted that
mothers should not be subject to extreme scrutiny. 0 3 Every action
a mother takes while pregnant affects her unborn child. 4
Although the court noted the invasiveness of the cesarean in its
holding, the following statement may have a stronger impact on a
fetal surgery case:
[T]he relationship between a pregnant woman and a fetus is
unique, and "unlike the relationship between any other plaintiff
and defendant. No other plaintiff depends exclusively on any
other defendant for everything necessary for life itself. No other
defendant must go through biological changes of the most
profound type, possibly at the risk of her own life, in order to
bring forth an adversary into the world. It is, after all, the
whole life of the pregnant woman which impacts upon the
development of the fetus.... [I]t is the mother's every waking
and sleeping moment which, for better or worse, shapes the
prenatal environment which forms the world for the developing
fetus. That this is so is not a pregnant woman's fault; it is a
fact of life."'0 5
The court further held that a woman does not have a duty to
guarantee the health of her child at birth.'0 6
3. Freedom from Servitude
Involuntary servitude is defined as "a state of bondage; the
ownership of mankind as chattel, or at least the control of the labor
and services of one man for the benefit of another, and the absence
of a legal right to the disposal of his own person, property and
100. Id. at 330 (emphasis added).
101. See supra part I.
102. See supra note 2S.
103. See In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d at 331.
104. See id.
105. Id. at 331-32 (quoting Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355, 360 (In. 1988)
(holding that a mother was not liable for unintentional infliction of prenatal injuries because
the effect of such a holding would subject a woman's every act while pregnant to state
scrutiny, thus violating her right to privacy and bodily integrity)).
106. See id. at 332.
STATE-COMPELLED FETAL SURGERY
services."' 7 The Thirteenth Amendment, one of the Amendments
used to define the Constitutional right to privacy, prohibits this
state of being." 8 The due process clause further fortifies the pro-
scription of servitude. A person cannot be held against their will
without due process. "Because our notions of liberty are inextric-
ably entwined with our idea of physical freedom and self-determina-
tion, the Court has often deemed state incursions into the body
repugnant to the interests protected by the Due Process Clause."'0 9
The procedure of cephalocentesis, though not very invasive, still
requires the mother to spend extra time in the hospital and be
subjected to monitoring. It may also require that the mother take,
against her will, drugs that would help to diminish the risk of pre-
mature labor." 0 If a mother is forced to go through the procedure,
remain in the hospital, undergo monitoring and take drugs, that
woman's rights have been subordinated, or even waived, on behalf
of the fetus and the state. Forced fetal surgery and the
corresponding treatments would be analogous to the constraints of
slavery or, at the very least, nine months of indentured servitude."'
B. .The Mother's Duties and Liabilities
1. Transplant Analogy
In examining a mother's obligation to undergo invasive
procedures to enhance the quality of or save the life of her baby, it
is important to understand what the mother's obligation would be
to undergo invasive procedures after the child is born. In cases
dealing with bone marrow112 or organ transplants, the courts have
107. Alicia Ouellette, New Medical Technology: A Chance to Reexamine Court-Ordered
Medical Procedures During Pregnancy, 57 ALB. L. REV. 927, 955 (1994) (citing Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 542 (1986)).
108. "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof
the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place
subject to their jurisdiction." U.S. CONST., amend XII, §1, cited in Oullette, supra note 107,
at 955 n.210.
109. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 287 (1990).
110. See text accompanying supra note 8.
111. See Ouellette, supra note 107, at 955-56.
112. Note the similarity between a bone marrow transplant and the cephalocentesis
procedure described in the scenario. Both involve using a large needle to draw out matter.
Compare Janet B. Korins, Curran v. Bosze: Toward a Clear Standard for Authorizing Kidney
and Bone Marrow Transplants Between Minor Siblings, 16 VT. L. REV. 499, 502 (1992)
(describing bone marrow transplant procedure), with supra part I (describing
celphalocentesis procedure). The cephalocentesis is arguably more invasive because it would
involve small incisions and a greater amount of monitoring after the procedure. See supra
notes 6-8 and accompanying text (noting the risks of the cephalocentesis procedure).
1998] 485
486 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 4:467
absolutely refused to compel transplants if the party from whom the
tissue is to be taken has refused the procedure." 3
In the case of In re Guardianship of Pescinski,14 the court
barred a kidney transplant from an institutionalized mental patient
to a younger sister."' The court so held because there was no show-
ing of consent by the donor or by any guardian of the donor, there
was no showing of benefit to the proposed donor, and the court
lacked power to authorize any surgical procedure on a living
person.
11 6
The Illinois Supreme Court in Curran v. Bosze refused to
compel twin minors to donate bone marrow to a half-sibling."7 The
court noted that the procedure posed very little risk to the twins,
was not very invasive, and that the sibling's life depended on the
bone marrow transplant, but nevertheless refused to compel the
minors to undergo the procedure, or even a blood test to determine
if the twins were compatible donors." 8 Interestingly, the party
requesting the court to order the bone marrow harvest of the twins
argued that the court should apply the substituted judgment test"9
113. See McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D & C.3d 90 (1978). See also Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537, 542 (1896).
114. 226 N.W.2d 180 (Wis. 1975).
115. See id. at 181.
116. See id.
117. Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d 1319, 1325-36 (1990).
118. The Appellate Court of Illinois relied on Curran in In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d
326, 333 (1994). The court also relied on In re Pescinski, 226 N.W.2d 180 (Wis. 1975), stating,
If a sibing cannot be forced to donate bone marrow to save a sibling's life, if an
incompetent brother cannot be forced to donate a kidney to save the life of his
dying sister, then surely a mother cannot be forced to under a cesarean section
to benefit her viable fetus.
In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d at 333-34 (citation omitted).
119. See Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1322. The substituted judgment test requires the court
to look to two sources to determine what the patient would have chosen if she were compe-
tent. The first source requires the guardian to '"determine if the patient had expressed ex-
plicit intent regarding this type of medical treatment prior to becoming incompetent."' Id. at
480 (citing In re Estate of Longeway, 133 Ill. 2d 33, 49 (1989)). If the guardian can supply
no "clear evidence of such intent," then the guardian must be guided by the incompetent
patient's personal values.
[Elven if no prior specific statements were made, in the context of the
individual's entire prior mental life, including his or her philosophical, religious
and moral views, life goals, values about the purpose of life and the way it
should be lived, and attitudes toward sickness, medical procedures, suffering
and death, that individual's likely treatment/nontreatment preferences can be
discovered. Family members are most familiar with this entire life context.
Id. at 480-81 (citations omitted). Note the ubiquitousness of the second source for the sub-
stituted judgment test. The second source becomes the general views, beliefs, and philo-
sophies of the incompetent patient, therefore, the guardian has almost complete control to
advise the court of what she subjectively believes to be the patient's intent. This test relies
strongly on the benevolence and objectivity of the family, guardian, or surrogate.
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- the same test proposed and approved by the court in In re A.C. "'
The court refused to use the substituted judgment test because the
test was deemed not applicable to twins who were only three-and-a-
half years old. The court decided that the "best interest of the
child" test was applicable and ruled that due to the lack of a
relationship between the twins and their leukemia-stricken half-
brother, and a lack of support from the mother of the twins, the
harvesting of bone marrow was not in the best interest of the
twins. 1
21
Although this case is not as applicable as McFall v. Shimp,122
the cases are especially applicable in situations where the mother
is unconscious or otherwise deemed incompetent.123 If a court ap-
plies the substituted judgment test then it will first look to see if
the mother made any explicit intentional statement, while still com-
petent, regarding her interest.24 If the mother has made no such
statement then the court will look to the mother's philosophy. It is
difficult to imagine a case where the court could say that the
mother's philosophy, values, or interests did not encompass the best
interest of her fetus. Furthermore, if the guardian is the person
who testifies regarding the woman's interests, and the guardian has
a strong desire to protect the fetus,'25 then the mother will almost
certainly be found to want to save her unborn baby. In addition, if
the fetus is viable, and the state has a policy of protecting viable
fetuses, 26 then the fetus' interests in its potential life will be given
heavy consideration.
Even without an incompetent mother, the transplant analogy
is very helpful when applied to the pre-viability versus post-via-
bility bright line. Generally in fetal therapy situations, the earlier
in the development of the fetus that a procedure is performed, the
greater the benefit to the fetus and the lesser the detriment to both
the mother and the fetus. In the introductory scenario, the earlier
the mother undergoes the cephalocentesis the lower the risk of
120. 573 A.2d 1235, 1248 (D.C. 1990). See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
121. See Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1345.
122. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
123. Such was the case with In re A.C. See text accompanying supra notes 46-65.
124. See supra note 119 and accompanying text (stating the court's determination of
sources for the substituted judgment test).
125. This desire could be especially strong if the mother, like A.C., had a terminal illness
and the anticipated baby was the only connection the family would have with the terminal
mother.
126. See infra part III.B.3 (discussing South Carolina's strong policy regarding fetuses and
criminal liability).
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premature labor. 12 7 If the state is able to compel a mother to
undergo fetal surgery post-viability, it would be more logical to
extend the state's right to compel fetal surgery to pre-viability: The
state, however, does not currently have a compelling interest in the
pre-viability fetus.
It may be argued that the pre-viability/post-viability deter-
minant of compelling interest is arbitrary and works to the detri-
ment of both the fetus and the mother. In the case of the trans-
plant analogy, however, it is more important to look at the common
law duty to aid another in the scenarios of pre- and post-birth. The
court in Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding held that the state could force
a mother to undergo an invasive procedure to aid another "person"
at the pre-birth stage of life, even though the fetus' post-birth life
was not guaranteed due to the many factors that could still cause
the fetus to be stillborn. Yet the court in McFall v. Shimp stated:
For a society which respects the rights of one individual, to sink
its teeth into the jugular vein or neck of one of its members and
suck from it sustenance for another member, is revolting to our
hard-wrought concepts of jurisprudence. Forcible extraction of
living body tissue causes revulsion to the judicial mind. Such
would raise the spectre of the swastika and the Inquisition,
reminiscent of the horrors this protends.'28
While the fetus is not the 'living body tissue" described in the
McFall court's language, the courts emotional response to the vio-
lation of human autonomy is relevant to the scenario presented.129
If the court could not "sink its teeth into the jugular" of one
individual to provide life for another, then the court should not
make an exception to "sink its teeth into" the womb of a mother to
provide life to her fetus.
127. See text accompanying supra note 8.
128. McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D & C.3d 90, 92 (1978), cited in Jeffrey P. Phelan, The
Maternal Abdominal Wall: A Fortress Against Fetal Health Care?, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 461,482
(1991).
129. See generally Rhoden, supra note 61, at 1979 (drawing an analogy between the court's
holding in McFall v. Shimp and the forced cesarean cases). But see Phelan, supra note 128,
at 482-485 (refuting Rhoden's analogy by analogizing the doctor's duty to respond to the fetus
in distress to the lifeguard's duty to save a drowning child, even if the mother refuses to save
the child).
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2. Duty Not To Abandon
A Florida appellate court went a step further in the case of In
re Dubreuil."3 ° In Dubreuil, a hospital sought to compel a new
mother to undergo blood transfusions which she needed to live.'
The mother refused the blood transfusions because they were
against her religious beliefs. The mother in Dubreuil was not preg-
nant. Her baby was not "held captive" in her womb. She had
already given birth by cesarean, but required blood because of com-
plications. The court noted that if the mother died because of her
refusal to undergo a blood transfusion, her four children, including
the newborn, would be abandoned.132 The court invoked the state's
parens patriae power and ordered the woman to undergo the trans-
fusion."13
The Supreme Court of Florida overturned the decision of the
lower courts in Dubreuil.'34 Its analysis, however, is still distur-
bing. The Supreme Court of Florida begins its opinion by noting
how significant the state's interest must be if it is to outweigh the
patient's constitutional rights - both to refuse medical treatment,
and to follow her religious beliefs.'35 The court then states that the
rights of the mother may be subordinated to the state's interest in
the children if there is a showing that the children will indeed be
left abandoned, with no family members to provide them with
adequate care. 3 '
130. 603 So. 2d 538 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992), jurisdiction accepted, 613 So. 2d 3 (Fla.
1993).
131. See id. at 539.
132. See id. at 540-41.
133. See id. The court in In re President and Directors of Georgetown College Inc., 331
F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964) came to a similar result, ordering life-
saving blood transfusions which were against the woman's religious beliefs in order to
prevent her from dying and leaving behind her seven-month-old baby. See id. at 1007. The
court based this decision on the law of abandonment, stating that because a mother would
not be allowed to abandon a child, the state should not allow the mother "this most ultimate
of voluntary abandonments." Id. at 1008. The court held that, therefore, the state had an
interest in preserving the life of the mother. See id.
134. In re Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 1993).
135. See id. at 823.
136. See id. at 827 ("Nonetheless, we decline at this time to rule out the possibility that
some case not yet before us may present a compelling interest to prevent abandonment.").
What is even more interesting is the dissent's argument that a mother's nurturing is
desperately needed by the child. See id. at 829 (McDonald, J., dissenting).
Children need and are entitled to have, their mothers; this need is sufficiently
great to outweigh one's free exercise of religious beliefs .... I suggest that
parenthood, under some circumstances at least, can indeed deprive on of the
right to live in accord with one's ow beliefs. Parenthood requires many
adjustments and often great sacrifice for the welfare of a person's children.
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The driving force behind the Dubreuil court's decision may well
be the concept of a mother's duty to her baby. If this duty is so
great that it outweighs the constitutional right to freedom of
• religion, privacy, and personal autonomy, then using this concept
of duty to require a mother to undergo fetal surgery is not a big
step.137 If a mother's constitutional rights to follow her religious
beliefs, to refuse medical care, and to die do not outweigh the state's
interest in preventing a child from being abandoned, how do these
rights effect a state's interest in compelling fetal surgery? The
court's logic is flawed. If a mother may freely choose to "abandon"
her baby after birth by placing it for adoption, the court should not
be able to deny a mother's constitutional rights in order to prevent
her children from being placed for adoption after her death.
Again, the viability test is illogical. Before viablity, a mother
may "abandon" her baby-to-be by aborting it. After birth, a mother
may "abandon" her baby by placing it for adoption. During
viability, however, the mother is trapped. By the reasoning of the
above cases she has, by carrying the fetus to the twenty-four to
twenty-eight week point of gestation, waived her constitutional
rights. Her duty is to keep living. She is to take (possibly) any
measures necessary not only to ensure the life of her fetus, but to
make sure that the baby-to-be's life and health will be as close to
normal, or better than normal, as possible.
3. Criminal Liability
In what are considered ground breaking cases, mothers are now
being prosecuted for child neglect, child abuse, and distribution of
Nearly every living creature of every species recognizes the duty to nurture its
offspring. Their lives are changed in doing so. Humans should not allow
religious beliefs, no matter how deeply seated or appropriately held, to neglect
this fundamental duty. Mothers do not abandon the nest.
Id. (emphasis added). The effects of this reasoning should become immediately clear.
Women, when they decide to become mothers, lose their constitutional rights. Those rights
are subordinated to what is deemed to be the best interest of the child. What should also be
disturbing is the lack of any mention regarding the fathers. Men, apparently, do not give up
these constitutional rights when they decide to become fathers. The double edge to this
sword is that, if the logic follows, a father's interests will be subordinated to the mother's
interests in the children because of the mother's special bond. After all, if the mother's
nurturing nature is so special to the child, a father's interests could never outweigh that
relationship, unless the mother's relationship with the child does not meet this ideal. At the
very least, fathers wishing custody should be appalled by this language.
137. Especially considering the hypothetical presented at the beginning of the paper. True
the interests that would be protected in a fetal surgery case would not be the interests of an
actual "person," however, there are not nearly as many constitutional rights to overcome in
the hypothetical: only the interests of privacy and personal autonomy.
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drugs to a minor if they ingest illegal drugs while pregnant. South
Carolina has stated as a matter of policy that it will prosecute, for
child neglect, pregnant women who have ingested illegal drugs. 138
In Whitner v. South Carolina, South Carolina's Supreme Court
stated that under South Carolina's abuse and endangerment
statute139 "the word 'child'... includes viable fetuses."'40 Whitner
pled guilty to criminal child neglect' 4 ' after cocaine metabolites
were discovered in her baby's blood. She had smoked crack cocaine
during the third trimester of her pregnancy. The court noted that
the policy of this section of the state code is to prevent children's
problems and the problems of their families.'42 The court then
noted that the effects of child abuse after birth often pale in
comparison to the effects while the child is in utero. "' Whitner
argued that by including a viable fetus in the definition of a person,
mothers could be prosecuted for ingesting harmful, yet legal,
substances such as alcohol or nicotine.'44 The court did not agree
with Whitner's conclusion that this result would be "absurd.' 45
Instead, the court stated that parents may be prosecuted for
criminal child neglect if they drink to excess and thus endanger
their child.14  If prosecuting a pregnant woman for drinking or
smoking while pregnant is not considered an absurd result, this
court vastly expanded the possibilities for criminal and civil liability
when it stated that a viable fetus is a person under child neglect
statutes. 
147
138. See Sally B. Donnelly, The Postpartum Prosecutor, TIME, Dec. 15, 1997, at 4. The
author interviews Charles Condon, South Carolina's Attorney General. Condon states, "A
fetus has inalienable rights that come from God." Id. Condon also refers to the fetus as "a
fellow South Carolinian." Id.
139. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-50 (Law Co-op. 1985).
140. Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 778 (S.C. 1995).
141. See § 20-7-50. The statute states:
Any person having the legal custody of any child or helpless person, who shall,
without lawful excuse, refuse or neglect to provide, as defined in § 20-7-490, the
proper care and attention for such child or helpless person, so that the life,
health or comfort of such child or helpless person is endangered or is likely to
be endangered, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be punished within
the discretion of the circuit court.
Id.
142. See § 20-7-20(C).
143. See Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 780.
144. See id. at 781.
145. See id.
146. See id. at 781-82.
147. See id. at 782. Although the Supreme Court does not find this possibility absurd, this
issue may be subject to the broad discretion of the state prosecutor. South Carolina Attorney
General Condon states, "I would be on a legal slippery slope if I tried to prosecute women
who used legal substances." Donnelly, supra note 138, at 4. Condon has, however, warned
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The court noted that many other states have overturned the
convictions of women who have ingested drugs while pregnant
because they were charged under distribution statutes. The court
went further, however, and stated that those states' decisions are
distinguishable because the states have refused to define a fetus as
a person.'48 It is the very extension of the definition of person to
include a fetus that allows the court to begin sliding down what
even South Carolina State Attorney General Condon refers to as "a
legal slippery slope." 49
In light of the state-compelled cesarean section cases, Condon's
statement is illogical. While the state cannot, or will not, require
a pregnant woman to stop taking legal, affirmative actions which
hurt her fetus - smoking or drinking - the state can compel a
woman to undergo incredibly invasive surgery because she has not
voluntarily acted to help her fetus. This dichotomy is analogous to
the state not recognizing an action for a mother's assault and
battery of her child, but requiring a woman to risk her life by
jumping in a lake to save a drowning child.
The Florida Supreme Court, in a case very similar to Whitner
restricted its definition of "person" to a baby once it is born.50 This
social workers and drug-abuse counselors that they too are subject to prosecution if they fail
to report a pregnant woman who is taking drugs. See id. The South Carolina Supreme
Court in Whitner notes a number of South Carolina bills that require the reporting of any
women who are found to be on drugs, and the mandatory testing of all newborns for drugs.
See Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 781 n.4. The implications of such legislation could be devastating.
Women may refuse to receive prenatal care if they discover they will be subject to
prosecution. Pregnant women may also refuse to seek drug counseling because of the lack
of privilege and possibility of prosecution. Mothers may also go into hiding to give birth to
avoid the state's mandatory testing of their babies. Legislation intended to save children
could endanger them, possibly more than the mother's initial illegal act.
148. See Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 783 (citing Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992);
Commonwealth v. Welch, 864 S.W.2d 280 (Ky. 1993); State v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710 (Ohio
1992); Reyes v. Superior Court, 141 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1977); State v. Carter, 602 So. 2d 995
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992); State v. Gethers, 585 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); State
v. Luster, 419 S.E.2d 32 (Ga. Ct. App.), cert. denied (Ga. 1992); Commonwealth v. Pellegrini,
No. 87970, slip op. (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 15, 1990); People v. Hardy, 469 N.W.2d 50 (Mich.
App.), app. denied, 471 N.W.2d 619 (Mich. 1991); Commonwealth v. Kemp, 643 A.2d 705 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1994)).
149. Donnelly, supra note 138, at 4. Hopefully the United States Supreme Court will
grant certiorari and block this downward progression. See Crack Mom Asks High Court for
Chance To Raise Her Son, DAILY PRESS (Williamsburg, Va.), Mar. 15, 1998, at A14. Whitner,
along with two other women who have been convicted under similar circumstances, plan to
appeal to the United States Supreme Court. Whitner's attorney states that South Carolina
Attorney General Charlie Condon and the Supreme Court of South Carolina have "made up
a new crime that the legislature never intended, and every medical group opposes, and that
these women could not have known." Id.
150. Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992). For an indepth look at Johnson and
the history of society's view of women's pregnancies, see generally Julia Epstein, The
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definition caused the court to narrow its decision to whether the
legislature intended the crime of distribution of cocaine to include
distribution through an umbilical cord during or after the birthing
process. 5' Again, the court's analysis hinged on the definition of
"person."'152 In its coup de grace, the court declined "the State's
invitation to walk down a path that the law, public policy, reason
and common sense forbid it to tread."'153
Yet again, the viability test has been abused. Those who wish
the state to step in and help fetuses by making mothers criminally
liable lose their greatest opportunity to help fetuses because of the
limits of the viability test. During the first trimester, when the
fetus is most vulnerable, the state arguably could not hold a preg-
nant woman liable for subjecting her fetus to dangerous and illegal
drugs because the woman has the right to abort her fetus. Thus the
state has lost its greatest window of opportunity to help the baby.'
On the other hand, by imposing criminal liability on pregnant drug
users, and on drug counselors for not reporting such an individual,
an addicted pregnant woman may be encouraged to avoid prenatal
care after viability and to abort before viability..
IV. PRE-VIABIUTY VERSUS POST-VIABILITY
The development of a fertilized egg from zygote to blastocyst to
embryo to fetus to viable fetus is fascinating. 5 Just as fascinating,
however, is the state's progression of interest in the fetus as it
develops. After only a few cell divisions of the fertilized egg, the
blastocysts"5 ' in the case of Davis v. Davis were determined to be
neither persons nor property, but to "occupy an interim category
Pregnant Imagination, Fetal Rights, and Women's Bodies: A Historical Inquiry, 7 YALE J.L.
& HUMAN. 139 (1995).
151. See id. at 1292 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 893.13(1)(c)1 (West 1989)).
152. See id.
No witness testified in this case that any cocaine derivatives passed from the
mother's womb to the placenta during the sixty-to-ninety seconds after the child
was expelled from the birth canal. That is when any "delivery" would have to
have taken place under this statute, from one "person" to another "person."
Id.
153. Id. at 1297.
154. I do not believe that the state's interest in the fetus should be extended to pre-
viability. In fact, I do not believe that the mother's rights should be subjugated at all. See
Part IV.
155. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 593-94 (Tenn. 1992) (citations omitted).
156. The blastocysts were four- to eight-cell entities. See id. at 593.
1998] 493
494 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 4:467
that entitles them to special respect because of their potential for
human life."' 57
At the stages of development before viability the preembryo,
embryo, or fetus may be aborted by the mother. 5 ' Some states
appear to have determined that if a mother has the intention of
carrying her baby to term, then she has waived her rights to abort
the fetus or to maintain her personal autonomy. The state may
then presumably intervene, even to the point of denying the
woman's rights, in order to protect the unborn baby.'59 For ex-
ample, the analysis in the case of In re Jamaica Hospital"6 went be-
yond the barrier of viability to hold that the state had a "highly
significant interest'' in the life of a previable fetus.'62
Although Roe held that the state has an interest in protecting
the fetus from abortion after viability, some states now claim to
have an interest in the fetus sufficient to allow the state to invade
the woman's body and perform medical procedures that may
endanger the mother.'63
157. Id. at 597. This is a fascinating case. For possibly the first time, the father was
allowed to "abort" the preembryos. The mother and father of the preembryos were divorced
and the court had to decide who would receive "custody" of the cryogenically frozen fertilized
eggs. The mother wanted to give them away or sell them to other infertile couples. The
father wished to destroy them. The court ultimately awarded the pre-embryos to the father
for destruction. See id.
158. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
159. See text accompanying supra notes 36-38.
160. 401 N.Y.S.2d 898 (Sup. Ct. 1985). See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
162. It should be noted that this "highly significant interest" was enough to overcome the
mother's First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion, a right that cannot be
overcome unless the state has a compelling interest.
For another example of a slip down the slope, see Gallagher, supra note 28, at 45. In 1986
a San Diego woman was arrested and jailed for six days on charges of medical neglect of her
fetus because, as the prosecutors alleged, she had disregarded her doctors' instructions and
had caused the brain death of her son. Prosecutors charged the mother with ingesting street
drugs, having sexual intercourse with her husband, and failing to immediately report to the
hospital when she began bleeding. Id. (citing Jennifer Warren, Woman Is Acquitted in Test
of Obligation to an Unborn Child, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1987, at 1). A municipal court judge
dismissed the charges, holding that the parental support statue was not intended for those
purposes. Id. (citing Doctors Aren't Policemen.... THE SAN DIEGO TRIB., Feb. 28, 1987, at
C-3, col. 1). A state legislator, incensed by the court's decision, introduced legislation
extending child-endangerment statutes to fetuses. Id. (citing Daniel C. Carson, Bill Offered
Based on Pamela Rae Stewart Baby Case, SAN DIEGO UNION, Mar. 7, 1987, at A-3 col. 1).
163. In essence the state has declared that a mother has the responsibility to rescue her
fetus. This rescue may not just be to save the life of the fetus. At some point the state may
require the mother to rescue the fetus from possible abnormality. But see supra note 11. See
Gallagher, supra note 28, at 34 (citing Robertson, supra note 53, at 456).
In the fetal rights [advocates] view, the general legal rule that individuals have
no duty to rescue no longer applies to pregnant women; it yields to a new
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The Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade established only that the
state's interest in the fetus becomes compelling at the point of
viability, and that after this point a fetus may be protected by the
state from a mother's right to choose abortion. 164 The Supreme
Court did not say that the state's interest in the fetus becomes so
compelling at the point of viability that the state may deny a
woman's rights to autonomy, privacy, informed consent, and re-
ligion. By only addressing the issue of abortion and not discussing
any other situations either in the holding or in the dicta, the
Supreme Court implicitly only extended the state's interest in the
case of abortion.
The Supreme Court's holding in Roe v. Wade, establishing
viability as determinative of the level of the state's interest, 16 is an
illogical basis for determining the state's interest in the future
health of the unborn child for three reasons.16 6 First, the test, as
applied by states in the cesarean section cases, has illogical results.
Under the viability test the state may not take any action, no mat-
ter how insignificant, before viability to benefit the fetus. The state
could not even require the pregnant woman to take folic acid,
arguably a very non-invasive measure that may provide a great
benefit to the fetus. After viability, however, the state not only may
act to benefit the fetus, the state may take drastic measures, such
as forcing a cesarean, even if it violates several of the mother's
constitutional rights. This result is illogical because it is during the
earliest development of the fetus that the smallest, least invasive
changes may do the. most good. It is during the first trimester when
most of the fetus' critical development, including that of the major
organs, takes place. And yet it is during this very critical period
that the state may not act to benefit the fetus.
To counteract this problem, the state could require a pregnant
woman to register a certificate of intent. 67 This certificate would
formulation under which a woman who "has chosen to lend her body to bring
the child into the world" assumes a unique and much more expansive duty.
Id.
164. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
165. See supra note 12.
166. But see Patricia A. King, The Juridical Status of the Fetus: A Proposal for Legal
Protection of the Unborn, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1647 (1979) (arguing that the viablity test is a
practical test for determining when a fetus should be granted legal protection, and that the
development of medical technology is inadequate to overcome the logic of the viability
criterion).
167. See Phelan, supra note 128, at 489 (citation omitted) ("[P]otential viability alone
should not determine when the state's interest becomes compelling. That interest should
arise at the point in a woman's pregnancy when she exercises her reproductive choice and
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state that the mother intended to give birth to the baby. Such a
certificate probably could not be used to deny a woman the right to
an abortion if she changed her mind, 8' but it could allow the state
to interfere to benefit the fetus before viability because of the
mother's statement that she intends to give birth to her fetus.
A certificate like this would cause several problems. First,
requiring a woman to disclose her intention to give birth or abort
may violate her right to privacy. Second, such legislation could
cause women to refuse to have pregnancy tests performed by
doctors because of the required disclosure. A woman could test at
home, keep her results hidden, and forego the certificate until she
had made a decision. By testing at home and waiting to see a
doctor, women and their unborn babies would possibly not receive
the prenatal care that would most benefit them. Finally, the certif-
icate would be practically useless. Women could avoid any hassle
by claiming that they intended to abort, even if they did not, to pre-
vent any state interference.
The second argument is that it is improper to use the viability
test. because abortion and fetal surgery are different enough to
require application of a higher standard in the case of compelled
fetal surgery. The Supreme Court determined that the state can
limit a mother's access to abortion after the fetus is viable. This
decision grants to the state the right to prevent a woman from
taking an affirmative action that kills her unborn, but viable, fetus.
This is very different from allowing the state to invade a woman's
body. In the case of abortion, the state interest's in the fetus may
outweigh the pregnant woman's privacy interest at the point of
viability. In the case of compelled fetal surgery, the state's interest
in a healthy, or even living, fetus would have to outweigh the
mother's rights to personal autonomy," 9 to be free from servitude,
and to informed consent. Because of the potential for violation of a
gross number of rights by the state in the case of compelled fetal
surgery, the viability test should not be the marker used by the
elects not to terminate her pregnancy. Often, this decision is made prior to the time of
potential viability.').
168. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). Casey
may limit the state's ability to force a mother to give up her right to abortion by signing an
intent certificate because this waiver would be an unduly burdensome obstacle to a woman's
right to obtain an abortion before viability.
169. See David C. Blickenstaff, Comment, Defining the Boundaries of Personal Privacy:
Is There a Paternal Interest in Compelling Therapeutic Fetal Surgery, 88 Nw. U. L. REV.
1157, 1198-99 (1994) (arguing that although the paternal interest is stronger in the case of
fetal surgery than abortion, "the intrusiveness of fetal surgery far exceeds the intrusiveness
of infringing on the abortion decision').
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courts to determine what action the state may take. What is at
issue here is "the ultimate violation of ... liberty."'7 ° There is just
too much at stake.
Third, the viability test is used by states to claim a compelling
interest and thereby require the pregnant mother to rescue her
fetus. Abortion is the death of the fetus by the affirmative action of
the mother. Death by an affirmative action is very different from
death caused by negligence or by inaction. In a criminal case, the
defendant may be subjected to medical tests of limited invasiveness
to determine if he committed the crime. 7' In a case of negligence,
the defendant may not be subjected to invasive medical tests. 71
The Supreme Court did not intend for the viablity test to
extend beyond the realm of the affirmative action of abortion. Nor
did the Supreme Court intend to require a mother to be forced to
rescue her fetus. Although several cases have allowed children to
sue for prenatal injuries,77 those cases are meant to safeguard the
fetus and the parents from the extra medical and care costs caused
by intentional acts or negligence by allowing the children, upon
birth, to sue for compensation. Although this may indeed indicate
an erosion of parental immunity, 74 the liability of a mother for acts
of negligence does not mean that a mother is required to act
affirmatively, or to undergo invasive procedures, to protect her
fetus. It's difficult to imagine a case where a court would hold a
mother liable for not undergoing (even somewhat) invasive medical
treatment to help her children. Just because the mother is
pregnant at the time the "child" needs medical care does not mean
the state can then force the mother to undergo an invasive medical
treatment.
170. Id. at 1199.
171. For example, the defendant may be required to give a semen sample, hair sample,
DNA sample, or blood sample.
172. To my knowledge, the only civil case where the court may order a party to a case to
undergo an invasive procedure is a suspected father in a paternity suit. There the suspected
father may be ordered to undergo a blood test to determine who is the father of the child.
This is done due to a policy to provide for children. Paternity testing could be analogized to
the situation at hand because in both cases the state is trying to protect the child. The
differences between a paternity test and the hypothetical are first, the degree of invasiveness
between a blood test and three incisions, and second, the fact that even a viable fetus has not
been defined as a "person," and is not subject to protection. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 162.
173. See, e.g., Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755 (N.J. 1984), cited in Gallagher, supra note
28, at 39 n.151.
174. See Robertson, supra note 53, at 439-42.
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V. CONCLUSION
In applying the doctrine of stare decisis, the judicial system
does not always stop to consider whether the application of a test
still makes sense. While the viability test may still be valid in the
context of abortion, its application in the context of fetal surgery is
illogical. If the state has a compelling interest only after the point
of viability, and thus cannot act until that point, then the state has
missed the opportunity to do the greatest good for the fetus while
causing the least amount of trauma to the fetus and the mother.
Furthermore, a test used to determine when the state's interest
may subjugate a mother's privacy interest should not be used to
determine when the state may violate a mother's rights to privacy,
personal autonomy, informed consent, freedom from servitude, and
possibly religious freedom. Finally, it is not proper to extend the
viability test to require a mother to rescue her fetus by invasive
medical procedures. For these reasons the viability test set forth in
Roe v. Wade is inappropriately applied in the scenario of fetal
surgery.
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